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Introduction 
 
Over the last decade there has been a growing concern across all sectors to improve 
the quality of governance of organisations. In the private sector, in the wake of a 
series of major corporate scandals of which the likes of Enron and Worldcom are only 
two of the latest, there has been a variety of initiatives to make board stewardship of 
public companies more effective. For example, in the UK there have been a string of 
major reports and reforms aimed at improving the self-regulation of companies by 
their boards (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998), which led to a 
combined code of good practice. The most recent report (Higgs, 2002) proposes a 
number of changes to strengthen the role of non-executive directors in the interests of 
increased effectiveness and accountability. 
 
Similar concerns exist about the effectiveness of public and nonprofit boards. 
Successive British governments, in their attempts to modernize and improve the 
provision of services have put public and non-profit organizations under pressure to 
improve their effectiveness through the imposition of performance measures, quality 
checks and audits, and through reforms to governance structures. It has become the 
practice of the government to compose ‘league tables’ of performance and to 
publicize the performance of all. This has created new kinds of pressures for 
organizations and their governing bodies – being ‘named and shamed’. Schools for 
example if deemed to be failing will be put into what is known as ‘special measures’ 
where the threat of having a ‘superhead’ brought in to sort it out will hang over the 
governing body for up to two years. Similar procedures have now been introduced for 
‘failing hospitals’. At the same time government has increasingly drawn the voluntary 
sector into the role of providing public services and there are moves towards greater 
quality checks and performance measurement for their work too. The Government’s 
Strategy Unit report (2002) Private Action, Public Benefit for example proposes more 
stringent requirements on larger charities (income over £1m) to complete a standard 
information return that will focus attention on the measurement of impact, 
achievement, stakeholder involvement, governance and trustee selection and abilities.  
 
A variety of reforms have been made with the intention of strengthening the 
governance of many public organizations, such as schools, colleges and hospital 
(Skelcher, 1998; Greer et al, 2003). For example in the health sector, health trusts 
have adopted a model of governance based on private sector boards, with the division 
between executive and non-executive directors (Ashburner, 2003). In the voluntary 
sector the Charity Commission, which regulates charitable activity in England and 
Wales, has tightened up the regulatory regime for charities and developed a new 
monitoring programme (Charity Commission, 2000). Investigations of charities by the 
Commission have increased and the results of these investigations are now publicized 
on its web site. It has also introduced an ‘Enhancing Charity’ programme which 
includes a review with up to 600 charities in the £0.25M and £10.0M income range 
annually. The stated aim is the prevent problems arising. More recently the Home 
Office has funded a study  to develop a strategy to improve governance across the 
voluntary sector, and a number of other related initiatives. 
 
As a result, the pressures on the boards of non-profit organizations to ensure that their 
organizations are well run and effective have never been greater. In this environment 
how boards try to prevent crises arising or deal effectively with them if they do is an 
important issue. Harker and Sharma (2001) in a study of company turnarounds 
suggest that how boards respond when things go seriously wrong can be a critical 
factors as to whether the organization survives or not. Lorsch and MacIver (1989) in 
their study of corporate boards also suggest boards play an important role in dealing 
with crises and conclude that it is mainly during crises that boards are ‘forced’ to 
come to the fore and exercise real power. Wood (1992) also suggests that crises are a 
key factor in non-profit boards to become more active  and indeed triggering a new 
stage in their life-cycle. Yet, given the likely significance of the board’s role when 
things go wrong, this phenomenon has been little studied, particularly in non-profit 
organizations. 
 
At last years ARNOVA conference we presented a paper that began to set out a 
conceptual framework to help understand how boards deal with crises and proposed a 
set of questions to guide empirical research (Mordaunt and Cornforth, 2002). Since 
then we have refined the framework further, developed our methodology for studying 
board crises and undertaken the first phase of empirical research. The aim of this 
paper is to briefly present the revised framework, then discuss some of the 
methodological problems in studying board crises and finally, present some 
preliminary findings from the empirical work. 
Conceptual framework 
 
The research draws upon theorizing about private sector boards and extends it to the 
non-profit sector. It will seek to explain how boards react to crises in terms of a four 
part conceptual framework: the context in which boards operate; the types of crises 
they face; the board’s and senior management’s capacity to deal with the problems 
they face and the different phases they and the organization passes through in 
addressing the crisis. However, before looking at these in more detail, it is important 
to say a few words about our broad theoretical orientation and how we conceive of 
organizational crises. 
 
An assumption that permeates much of the literature on boards and crises is that crises 
can be treated as if they were objective events. But it is not that simple.  Making a 
judgment that an organization is not performing well is not at all straightforward, and 
there is often disagreement and different interpretations of events. ‘Crises’ are not 
objective facts, but are socially constructed. This is not to suggest that there may be 
events underlying the crises, which are commonly agreed, such as the withdrawal of 
funding, or conflict between the board and management, but that these events are 
often seen and interpreted in different ways. Acknowledging this focuses greater 
attention on the processes by which a shared understanding (or recognition) of crises 
develops. It draws attention to the fact that there may be conflict and disagreement 
over the nature of the problems facing the organizations and just how serious they are. 
It also allows for the possibility that different individuals and stakeholders may try to 
construct ‘crises’ in particular ways in order to mobilize support for actions they wish 
to pursue. 
 
How are crises distinguished from the ordinary management problems that all 
organizations are constantly confronted with? For our purposes we consider it a crisis 
when at least some of the key actors in the organization believe the problems the 
organization face seriously threaten the organization’s (or part of its) survival or 
legitimacy in some way. 
 
Context 
As Pettigrew and McNulty (1995, 1998) argue the behaviour of boards will be both 
constrained and enabled by the wider context in which they operate. They distinguish 
between the outer context, which includes the legal, political, social and regulatory 
context, which can help shape expectations and aspirations of boards, and the inner 
context of the board and organization itself. 
 
For our purposes the inner context of the board –it’s history, structure and culture - is 
particularly important. The size and structure of the board, its methods of selecting 
and socialising board members, its norms of conduct, and its relationship with the 
executive can all both constrain and enable what is possible for the board to do. For 
example, Lorsch and MacIver (1989:91-6) suggest boards often operate with strong 
norms of polite behaviour which discourage board members from openly questioning 
or challenging the chief executives performance or proposals, or meeting outside the 
board room. Both norms can make it difficult for boards to recognise and deal with 
crises. 
 
Pettigrew and MacNulty (1995) suggest that the attitudes and behaviour of board 
chairs and chief executives can be particularly important is shaping the culture of the 
board and how active it is. They distinguish between ‘minimalist’ boards, where 
power is concentrated in the hands of the executive and ‘maximalist’ boards, where 
power is more widely dispersed. Bradshaw et (1992) identify similar patterns for non-
profit boards, which they call the ‘CEO dominant’ and ‘board dominant’. In addition 
they identify two other patterns of relationship one where the professional staff of the 
organizational are dominant in setting the overall direction of the organization, and 
other their ‘collective governance, by a range of stakeholders.  
 
Types of crises 
The degree to which a board can shape particular issue will also depend on the content 
of the issue they face(Pettigrew and MacNulty, 1998: 204). The remit of the board 
means that it is more legitimate to focus on some issues than others. In this research 
we are particularly interested in different types of crises boards face, and the 
challenges they raise. 
 
Based on case studies of private sector boards during crises, Lorsch and MacIver 
(1989) suggest that the main challenges boards face will depend on the nature of the 
crises. They distinguish between four kinds of crises according to whether they are – 
sudden or gradual, and whether their origins are internal or external to the 
organization. Sudden crises include lawsuits or the death of a chief executive (CE), 
and gradual crises include ‘industry’ decline, rise of competition, management 
failure, and dissension among managers. They suggest that the constraints on boards 
such as the time commitment required and the importance of their relationship with 
management will vary according to the type of crisis. This framework, summarized in 
Figure 1, provides a useful starting point for the investigation of non-profit boards. 
 
 Sudden Gradual 
External • Time 
• Use of experts 
• Tension among 
accountabilities 
• Relationship with 
management 
• Information 
• Board leadership 
Internal • Time 
• Relationship with 
management 
• Board leadership 
• Relationship with 
management 
• Information 
• Board leadership 
 
Figure 1: The key challenges boards face during different types of crises (adapted 
form Lorsch and MacIver, 1989:165) 
 
 
However, the structural differences between non- and for-profit boards, such as their 
voluntary membership and the frequent exclusion of senior management from board 
membership, suggest that the constraints faced by non-profit boards are likely to be 
somewhat different, (Cornforth and Mordaunt, 2003). In particular the two factor 
mentioned above may make the time board members can commit, and the board’s 
relationship with management particularly important constraints. 
 
Capacity of the board and executive 
The ability of boards to deal with crises will also vary according to what we will call 
the capacity of the board and the executive. This is similar to what Pettigrew and 
MacNulty (1995, 1998) have called the ‘will and skill’ of boards. They argue that if 
board members are going to be successful in using their power sources they not only 
have to be skilful in exercising their powers, they also must have the will to use them 
effectively. They must also be able to commit the time, which is very important given 
their voluntary status, and have the emotional resilience to challenge the status quo 
and stick the course. We have know a number of boards where board members have 
resigned when things start to get difficult and the role becomes much more demanding 
of their time and energy. 
 Phases in dealing with crises 
The literature on organisational turnaround generally suggests that there are stages in 
the process of dealing with crises which may lead to recovery/failure, for example 
Slatter and Lovett (1999: 61) in their study of corporate turnarounds suggest – crisis 
denial, hidden crisis, disintegration of the organisation, organisational collapse, and 
recovery/failure. We believe it is useful to distinguish between four broad phases, 
which we will call recognition, mobilisation, action and transition. We are not 
suggesting that organizations will progress through all these phases in a linear 
manner. Organsiations may get stuck during the early phases for example the crisis is 
denied or there are conflicting views and it becomes impossible to mobilize support of 
action. Equally, attempts to deal with an immediate crisis may lead to recognition that 
there are deeper problems with have to be addressed. 
 
Recognition phase 
At least board members must recognize that there is an important crisis or problem 
before they can be addressed. As note above, Lorsch and MacIver (1989) suggest that 
the nature of crises will influence how easily they are recognised by boards. They 
argue that sudden crises, such as a takeover threat or the death of a CEO are difficult 
to ignore, but gradual crises, such as a long-term deterioration in performance, are 
much more difficult to spot. They suggest two main reasons for this. As the board is 
usually dependent on management, management may present information in such 
away that it is not obvious there is a crisis, and even if the board feels something is 
wrong there are often strong norms about avoiding open conflict and challenging 
senior management. 
 
The difficulty of recognising gradual crises may be compounded by two other factors 
in non-profit organisations. First, indicators of performance are often more ambiguous 
than in businesses, making it more difficult to judge what is happening. Second, 
trustees many lack the necessary experience and confidence to make these 
judgements. In many small non-profits board members may never have been a 
member of any other board and therefore lack experience of comparators of 
performance. Research by Gaskin (2001) indicates that some board members would 
like to have benchmarks against which to judge performance for they feel inadequate 
and over-awed in the face of staff knowledge and understanding of the ‘business’ and 
therefore unable to intervene effectively in the work of the organization.  
 
Mobilisation phase 
Even where some on the board members do recognize the underlying problems, 
getting the whole board and executive to address may be problematic. The problem 
may be denied or it may be difficult to get some kind of consensus for action. A 
process of mobilizing support for change will need to occur. Ryan (2002) offers the 
advice to funders not to try to go it alone and the same is likely to apply to board 
members. It may be difficult for a lone critic to mobilize the board and they are more 
likely to end up ousted as a trouble-maker. Not all the board members need to 
recognize the nature of the problems underlying the crisis, but probably the key 
influencers on the board do need to. 
 Meyer and Zucker (1989) suggest that different stakeholders have differing interests 
in overcoming performance problems. Whereas boards and funders are likely to be 
interested in overcoming crises by making changes and improving performance, staff 
and customers are more likely to be more concerned with organizational maintenance 
– keeping things are they are to preserve existing jobs and services. When stalemate 
exists between these countervailing positions, because it is not possible to mobilize a 
coalition for change, the result is ‘permanently failing’ organizations.  
Nor are all organizations that perform poorly deemed to fail or be in crisis. Seibel 
(1999) cites the notion of ‘successful failures’ – organizations that are performing 
badly, but because they assist society to address its cognitive dissonance about social 
problems that are troubling but inherently irresolvable, the board combines with 
funders to maintain the illusion that they are doing something useful. Here resolving 
crisis is not the issue, but rather maintaining the illusion that the organization is 
‘dealing with the problem’ whether it is homelessness or child cruelty.  
 
Lorsch and McIver (1989) suggest that in order for boards to take a more proactive 
role they have to break established norms that they do not openly criticize the CEO 
and expose failings and secondly, that they do not socialize with each other outside 
board meetings. They also see as critical, the willingness of one member to put 
themselves into a leadership position. This problem may be particularly acute in the 
commercial world in the USA where the roles of board chair and CEO are often 
combined. This suggests that non-profits might be more likely to tackle problems as 
the legal and regulatory framework means that board members including the chair are 
independent of management. However, as we indicated above there are other 
constraints that may prevent this happening. The ability of board members to discuss 
issues outside board meetings and free from management also appear to be crucial 
factors. The building of social contacts and trust between board members is an 
important part of the process. In one organization in which one of the authors was a 
board member a key factor in mobilizing the board was the introduction of telephone 
conferencing. This enabled the board to overcome distance factors inhibiting more 
frequent board meetings that had often been ill-attended. As a result the board was 
able to agree a strategy for change. 
 
Action phase 
Once the problem or crisis is acknowledged by the board and support has been 
mobilised to tackle it, the board has to decide what the best way forward is. As Lorsch 
and MacIver (1989) note time is a critical issue in sudden crises as boards have to 
limited time to resolve problems. This issue may be even more acute in non-profit 
organizations where board members are volunteers. A local development agency, 
where one of the authors was on the board, faced a crisis when there was a major cut 
in funding and dissension among the staff. In order to help resolve the situation, the 
board met six times in as many weeks as well as additional contacts between the 
office-bearers by telephone and e-mail to formulate a solution. This level of 
commitment may cause some board members to resign from the organization at this 
stage being unwilling to give their time to conflict resolution. 
Slatter and Lovett (1999) in their study of corporate turnaround indicate that at this 
stage the problems can appear multitudinous and there are some key issues to be 
resolved. There is a need to assess whether the organization can survive in the short-
term and whether it is viable in the medium to long-term. There may also be a need to 
do some deals with funders to buy space for the change. Options need to be assessed 
and key problems diagnosed to determine the best strategy for short-term survival.  At 
the same time there is a need to manage relationships with all the key stakeholders 
and in particular the organizations senior management or staff. If, as in many crisis 
situations the problem is at least partly due to the management failures, and the board 
is having to manage the crisis either without a chief executive or without their full 
support, the challenges can be daunting. It is small wonder that many of these 
volunteers decide that this not something they wish to tackle. 
  
Transition phase 
Once the main changes to resolve the immediate problems have been made there is a 
further phase of transition. During this phase further smaller changes may need to be 
made to consolidate the change process. In addition people often require a longer 
period to adjust emotionally to the changes that have been made (Bridges, 1991; 
Allison, 2002).  Paradoxically it is during this phase when the organization is on the 
road to recovery that board turnover may occur. The stresses and time commitment 
needed to resolve the crisis may take its toll on board members. Our experience 
suggests that some trustees are inclined to feel that they have made their contribution 
and take the opportunity to resign. This can have the effect of removing support from 
staff just when there is still much work on organizational issues to be undertaken.  
New trustees may not have the same sense of commitment to the organization or a 
sense of what it has gone through. Perhaps as a result the board may gradually move 
back into a much more passive role. Wood (1992) suggests that non-profit boards 
oscillate between a ‘super-managing’ phase where the board effectively runs the 
organisation, followed by a gradual drift back to CEO dominance, until the next crisis. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Designing research to explore how non-profit boards deal with crises raises a number 
of important methodological problems. McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) note the over-
reliance on survey research in studying corporate governance and call for studies 
which get closer to the board room. Similarly Peck (1995: 139-140) notes the over 
reliance upon one source of data, usually the perceptions of board members gathered 
through interviews or questionnaires. This is problematic for two reasons. First he 
suggests board members are unlikely to ‘reveal their own irrelevance’ and so are 
likely to over emphasise the relevance of their role.  Second the studies lack any 
independent confirmation of actors’ accounts. As a result Peck calls for more detailed 
case studies of boards that rely on observation and other methods. 
 
However, conducting case studies of boards facing crises is likely to be particularly 
difficult. Gaining access to organisations that are experiencing crises is likely to be 
more difficult than usual for a number of reasons. Sudden crises by their very nature 
happen quickly and may be over before it is possible to gain access, even if it is 
possible to find out about the crisis in the first place. In addition in such pressured 
situations organizations may be unwilling to give access to researchers. In principle it 
may be easier to gain access to organisations experiencing gradual crises. However, it 
may be difficult to gain access at the early stages in the ‘crisis’, because as we have 
argued above, problems may be difficult to recognise or are denied. Equally gradual 
crises may take a long time to resolve requiring longitudinal research over a number 
of years.  Even where access is granted actors may be unwilling to talk or try to cover 
up failings.  
 
One way in which some of these problems may be addressed is through the use of 
multiple methods of data collection. We intend to use three main methods: interview 
with practitioners, who have first hand experience of boards having to deal with 
crises; interviews and discussions with an ‘expert’ panel of consultants and advisers 
who work with boards facing crises, and third we will conduct a small number of case 
studies of board facing different kind of crises. By triangulating between these 
different data source we hope to overcome some of the problems identified above. 
Each of these will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
Preliminary research has shown that practitioners are willing to discuss their 
experiences of how boards deal with crises if it can be done in such away as to 
preserve their own anonymity and that of the case. Indeed after making presentations 
a number of individuals have volunteered to be interviewed. We will be carrying out 
interview with both board members and chief executives who have been in crisis 
situations. 
 
One group of people who have regular experience in how boards deal with crises are 
board consultants and advisers, such as insolvency experts. It is intended to interview 
a range of experts about their experiences of advising non-profit organisations dealing 
with crises. In addition a small number of focus group discussions will be run with 
practitioners and advisers to comment on findings and issues emerging from the 
research.  
 
Finally, a small number of cases of board dealing with crises will be examined. These 
will be chosen to compare the challenges and constraints facing boards dealing 
different kinds of crises. Access will be facilitated by a small expert panel set up to 
advise the project. 
 
Next we report on the initial findings from some pilot interviews and a group 
discussion. 
 
The Evidence 
 
As a way of developing our ideas about the issues of organisational crisis, failure and 
recovery, we have been making presentations and holding discussions with 
practitioner audiences e.g. Charity Fair 2002, 2003, Economic and Social Research 
Council Seminars on Governance 2002 and so on. More recently one of us facilitated 
a workshop as part of a major consultancy on governance covering similar issues. At 
one of these seminars, a number of people offered to talk further with about their own 
organisation’s experience of crisis and what they observed the process to be. 
 
This part of the paper gives an account of crises and their consequences as they saw 
them. Obviously their view is partial and one-sided and there are aspects of the cases 
that are not clear, but they do tell stories that other practitioners seem to recognise. 
This is affirmed in the discussion by indication when similar issues arose in the focus 
group or was raised in the interview with the expert. This suggests that there may be 
some common features to the dynamics of crisis management for boards which merit 
further and more systematic investigation. We analyse what these may be, tease out 
some of the common threads that run through the cases and develop some conclusions 
that will generate hypotheses to test in subsequent research. 
 
 
The Context 
 
The four cases are very different. The first is a community based urban regeneration 
project (URP) in a deprived part of a British city. The second is an old-established 
professional membership association (PMA). The third is a local branch of a federal 
organisation (LBF) and the final case is a highly specialist service for children with 
disabilities (SDO).  The expert is an accountant specialising in nonprofit organisations 
with problems. The focus group was drawn from people with a particular interest in 
governance of small organisations.  Following  the theoretical framework we 
developed earlier, firstly we will discuss the contexts of the cases.   
 
 Case 1 
URP 
Case 2 
 PMA 
Case 3 
 BFO 
Case 4 
 SDO 
Internal Context 
Board 
composition 
Generally 
inexperienced 
local activists  
 
Composed of 
members of the 
organisation 
Large 
‘representative’ 
board including 
funders, other 
local 
infrastructure 
bodies and local 
authority 
agencies, 
volunteers and 
staff.  
 
Initially trustees 
put in place by 
parent trust – 
mainly drawn 
from business. 
Became self-
perpetuating.  
 
Size and 
subcommittees 
 
10 people – no 
subcommittees 
initially later 
established 
personnel sub. 
 
 
8 people with 
large approving 
policy sub-
committee of 35   
 
25 people - 
Personnel 
subcommittee of 
5. 
 
 
 Around 6 people 
- but unclear how 
many members 
there were 
supposed to be 
 
Issues in 
board/staff  
relations 
‘Collusion’ 
between founding 
chair and chief 
officer 
Board included 
two former 
members of staff 
of the 
organisation from 
1970’s one of 
whom is currently 
CEO not secretary 
to the board 
which rested with 
a long-standing 
volunteer. 
 
Mainly reactive to 
staff initiatives – 
appeared 
uninterested in the 
organisation 
 
chair 
2.  Unwilling to 
cede authority to 
the CEO 
3.. Board has 
strong sense that 
it is ‘accountable 
to history’. 
External Context 1. Government 
keen to involve 
‘socially excluded 
areas’ 
regeneration issue 
 
2. Meshed into 
local political 
‘mafia’ 
1. Stability of 
external funding 
environment 
shifted in 1980’s 
1. Head office 
seeking to 
modernise local 
branches by 
introduction of 
new technology 
and quality 
standards, 
performance 
indicators etc. 
 
 
From this it appears that each organisation arises from quite different contexts and has 
quite different sorts of people and relationships between the board and the staff. 
However, there is one common feature. Sometimes in the literature it is referred to as 
‘founder syndrome’ but it is not quite as straightforward as that. The expert informant 
described it as ‘one strong individual’ – in each of these cases there had been a 
dominant personality in the immediate period before the crisis erupted. In the URP, 
there was a founding chair who had been in place for 15 years, in the PMA there had 
been a long-serving CEO for 20 years prior the period of crisis erupting in the early 
1990’s, in the LBF there was had been a founding CEO who had been in post for 19 
years and the SDA had had a strong founder who was ousted in after 8 years, but the 
CEO was also a strong personality.  This settled order was disturbed in all the cases. 
 
Types of Crises 
 
We will now discuss how the cases compare on the types of crises and presenting 
problems they displayed  
 
 Case 1 
URP 
Case 2 
 PMA 
Case 3 
 BFO 
Case 4 
 SDO 
Type of Crisis – 
Presenting 
Problem 
Multiple- sudden 
1. Money for 
grants going 
astray 
2. Resignation of 
chair 
3. Resignation of 
senior 
development 
officer 
Multiple - sudden 
and gradual 
1. Ballot-rigging 
for board by chief 
officer and 
subsequent 
dismissal and bad 
publicity 
2. On-going 
financial crisis 
leading to staff 
redundancies 
Multiple – sudden 
1. Breakdown of 
relationships 
between new 
director and 
members of the 
team 
2. Followed by 
breakdown of  
CEO/chair 
relationship  
3. Grant cut by 
local government 
funder  
Multiple sudden 
and gradual 
1. Failure of 
merger with major 
institution 
2. Leads to 
deterioration of 
CEO/Chair 
relationship 
3. Underpinned 
by long-standing 
funding problems 
 
One thing that is interesting compared to Lorsch and McIver’s analysis is the multi-
layered nature of the crises. Troubles did not come singly.  
 
In all the cases there was a breakdown in trust at some point in the emergence of the 
crises. In the URP, it was the questioning by one committee member about missing 
grant applications that precipitated the resignation of the chair. Once the collusive 
nature of their relationship with the chief officer had been broken other problems 
rapidly became apparent. In the PMA, the chief officer became frustrated with the 
blocking of ‘reform/ modernisation’ by two members of the board and sought to 
remove them by any means. In the LBF as relationships with the staff worsen, the 
Chair starts to lose confidence in the CEO leading to them becoming more 
interventionist in day to day management generating a downward spiral of stress and 
worsening relationships. In the SDO, pressure on the chair and the committee to take 
more responsibility for the decisions, leads to worsening relationships with the CEO,  
combined with the latter’s perception of the chair making fundamental mistakes in 
dealing with problems. 
 
Moreover, for all of the organisations, underlying the issues that precipitated the 
turmoil, were more deep-seated problems. Three of the organisation had longstanding 
funding problems and the other was the recipient of a sudden large change (for the 
better) in their financial situation. It was noted by the focus group that both 
withdrawal of funding and paradoxically, suddenly receiving large grants are both 
triggers for crises in nonprofits. 
 
A common factor underlying all of the crises was neglect of some of the basics of 
good organisational governance and management. The URB had been turned from a 
community association to a part of an urban regeneration partnership without 
apparently any preparation – there had been no board development, no systems and 
procedures established, there appeared to be no staff management and little 
knowledge of what was required to run an effective organisation. The PMA had 
outdated governance structures and it had failed to spot the seriousness of 
environmental changes which meant that the income stream it could rely on for many 
years was in substantial decline with consequences for the maintenance of the 
organisation. The LBF was subject to a centrally-driven change agenda that that was 
top-down and had a governance system that was poorly in touch with the organisation 
– the board was banned from visiting the organisation during working hours as this 
was seen as breaching confidentiality. This probably meant that the board adopted an 
implementation strategy without regard for local sensitivities as they were 
insufficiently in touch with the work. The SDO, being set up a wealthy founder who 
had dipped into her pocket when finances were needed, had never really had to clarify 
its raison d’être nor did it have a robust strategy or fundraising plan even after she had 
departed. In none of the organisations had work been done with the board to build a 
common purpose and vision for the organisation, but in this one in particular, the 
board seemed by the account to be semi-detached from the organisation.  This was 
underscored by the focus group where people observed that governance fails when 
members lack a common purpose. However the expert put a different spin on this – 
observing that the real problem in nonprofits was a general commitment to ‘mission 
not management’.  Boards focus on ends and pay insufficient attention to means.  
  
The Capacity of the Board and the Executive 
 
In our cases some were more successful than others in resolving the crises as the next 
table shows. 
 
 
Case 1 
URP 
Case 2 
 PMA 
Case 3 
 BFO 
Case 4 
 SDO 
Turnaround 
achieved 
Partial – initially 
successful but 
momentum lost 
and slipping into a 
new set of 
problems 
Partial and several 
attempts at it – 
very difficult to 
create a coalition 
for change hence 
4 directors since 
1993 including an 
interim change 
manager. Perhaps 
example of 
‘permanent 
failure’? 
Yes – new 
Director in post 
with revised job 
description but 
information re 
degree of success 
limited as 
informant no 
longer with 
organisation 
No – organization 
closed down 
 
What were the factors in the capacity of the boards and the managers that 
distinguished the more successful from the less successful in dealing with the crises? 
 
One focus group member observed that she loved crises because of the opportunity 
for change they presented and this is confirmed in the literature: a crisis may be ‘an 
opportunity for reform, innovation, exercising leadership and organisational and 
individual learning’ Sundelius (1998) in Borodzicz et.al. In change management terms 
they can be an ‘unfreezing moment’ when major changes in the organisation may be 
made. Which of our boards seems to have had the capacities for change and which did 
not? What did those capacities appear to be and what were the constraining factors for 
all the organisations. 
 
First of all, the board has to want to make the change. This requires some leadership. 
Someone has to be prepared to take the lead in sorting things out. In the URP, our 
informant claimed to be that person – she had some skills gained in another context 
which made her aware of the need to formalise the organisation and insert an ‘element 
of management’ into the organisation. In the PMA one of the problems they 
encountered was the difficulty in creating a coalition for change. The board is high 
status and that has made it difficult for successive CEO’s to manage the board and 
interest them in the process of managing the organisation as opposed to the mission.  
The attempts at leadership have been coming from the management side and the 
desire to maintain the status quo has come from the board – the obverse of Meyer and 
Zucker’s argument who see the staff as likely to seek maintenance and the board as 
having an interest in change and efficiency.  In the LBF leadership came from a newly 
appointed chair who was semi-retired and who therefore had more time to pop into 
the office and see how things were going. In the SDO again the CEO attempted to 
provide the leadership and was frustrated by her inability to control what the board 
did not do. There appeared to be little leadership from the board and what there was, 
the CEO felt was inappropriate. 
 Time was a critical factor for all the boards – there was a critical decision to be made 
as to whether the board members wanted to devote the time to sorting out the 
organisation. And this seems to have been the issue in the SDO – in the end the board 
were not sufficiently committed to the organisation to want to devote the time to it. 
When it was going reasonably well, they were happy to let the CEO take the lead and 
to approve her suggestions, but when the going got tough, they seemed not to have the 
energy to sort it out.  In the PMA, the board met about once every six weeks but did 
not appear to have the time to meet outside of meeting and also they were 
geographically dispersed which seems to have been a further barrier. Part of the 
assessment as to whether it was worth the time investment was some assessment of the 
support of other board members to tackle the problems.  
 
In both the relatively successful cases, the boards had access to expertise. In the case 
of the URP, they had to go looking for it, but once they had asked for help it was 
freely available from local infrastructure agencies. The expert concurred in the vital 
role played by locally available expertise from these agencies. Once the chief officer 
had left, in addition the board secured a secondee from the local authority, as an 
interim manager to help sort things out. In the LBF, the personnel subcommittee itself 
possessed the necessary expertise – they were lawyers, accountants, retired academic 
and a very senior civil servant. In the SDO, the expertise the chair accessed was poor 
and this contributed to the worsening of relationships between her and the CEO.  At 
one point the PMA brought in an interim manager but he did not seem able to 
overcome the paralysis of the power struggle with the board.  It was suggested that 
this might have been because he was from a local authority background and lacked 
expertise in managing what was actually quite a small voluntary agency. 
 
The expert had a number of observations on the capacities boards needed. He 
recognised that time, skills and systems are needed but he felt that many boards are 
unable to tackle problems because they lack the emotional resources to deal with the 
issues. He felt that this was a particular problem for organisations where there was a 
high degree of user participations and that these needed strong support if they were to 
survive a crisis. Emotional resources were also an issue for the focus group who felt 
that negotiation skills were key to tackling problems and that this was particularly 
tricky in the voluntary sector because there was often role fusion – with the personal 
being hard to separate from the roles.  Indeed both the expert and the focus group 
identified conflict avoidance as a key factor preventing boards dealing with crises. 
Although it may be argued that this is feature of all life, the expert in particular felt 
that this was more of a problem in nonprofits because of their highly personalised 
cultures which made it harder for boards to raise difficult questions with highly 
committed staff for fear of how they may react. 
 
One issue not present in commercial contexts that constrains board is politics. It is 
clear that intervention by an external agency can be key in precipitating a reluctant 
board to take action but in particular in the URP, the local political power structure 
actually prevented external people from intervening. The founder chair was tied into 
the politics of the locality and my informant speculated that it was probably too much 
of a risk for local government officials to draw attention to the failings of the project 
and perhaps in the process bring themselves into the line of fire from their own 
political masters.  
 
Phases in dealing with crises 
 
We now turn to the extent to which our boards passed through phases in dealing with 
crises. How did they recognise and conceptualise the crises and what did they do 
about them? 
 
Recognition 
 
This is obviously the critical first step and the theoretical framework drawing on 
Slatter and Lovett presupposes a rational action framework, where boards recognise 
crises and deal with them or if they fail to do so, this is because they have imperfect 
information. However the picture in reality seems more complex than this. In the 
URP, the factors that precipitated the recognition of the funding crisis was that a new 
member joining the board was able to ask questions that others either did not 
recognise as problems because they had  a limited experience or had deemed politic 
not to ask. This role of a new member in asking difficult question seems to be a 
common feature in a number of cases. There are also strong pressures not to ask to 
questions as our focus group identifies, for if a board member asks questions that 
expose problems then there follows potentially a responsibility to deal with them. This 
is confirmed by the expert who felt that while basic information and communication 
are vital in recognising problems there were those who blocked out recognising 
problems – ‘some individuals shut out any possibility that someone else might be 
right’.  
 
In the PMA successive CEOs attempted to get the board to focus in a more consistent 
manner on the problems confronting the organisation but with limited success at least 
in part constrained by their own lack of experience of operating within a small 
organisation context. Although the presenting problem was the dramatic events 
triggered by the ballot-rigging, it was the underlying issues of a power struggle 
between the board and the CEO for control of the agenda and the financial problems 
that posed the more serious crises. Our focus group observed that ‘different power 
bases and no protocols for dealing with them’  were major sources of crisis.   The 
problems in this organisation keep rumbling around because no one is empowered to 
allow the board and the staff to talk about their differences in a constructive way. The 
last but one CEO brought the boards attention to the financial crisis in a dramatic way, 
by taking no salary for three months – however as he had other income he could 
afford to do this – but it did at least get the board to address the need to reduce costs 
and staffing. 
 
In the LBF the board could not avoid the turbulence in the management team as first 
one member of staff resigned claiming she was unable to work with the CEO 
followed by another member of staff taking out a grievance. But what really focused 
them on dealing with the issues was a funding cut by one of the local authority 
funders. It was at this point that the problems started to feel like they could not be 
resolved by this particular individual. However, the issues seem to have been dealt 
with a fairly surface manner and the underlying issues about culture and strategy 
probably remain unaddressed. 
 
The SDO on the other hand was quite straightforward. The board may or may not 
have recognised the problems, but what they appear to have been clear about was that 
they did not wish to involve themselves in the hassle of sorting things out. They took 
a swift decision to close the organisation down once the proposed merger failed. It 
seems that here is a board that was highly dependent on the CEO. What precipitated 
the merger talks was the CEO indicating that they needed to undertake some 
succession planning as she was considering when she might retire.  This seems to be 
reinforced as when the organisation closed, board members expressed irritation that 
they would have to take responsibility for finalising the closure with the Charity 
Commission as the CEO could no longer act for them as she was made redundant. 
 
Mobilisation 
 
In both the cases where there was a degree of success, small subgroups of the board 
are involved. In the URP an informal sub-group emerged meeting outside of board 
meetings. After the board meeting four of them – the main office bearers would go to 
the pub and discuss what they might do and how it might be achieved. This sub-group 
also made an assessment of what it was realistic for them to seek to achieve given the 
time constraints they faced (they were all in full-time work). As a result of this there 
grew up a degree of trust between them which gave them confidence to tackle the 
problems.  
 
Similarly in the LBF, it was in the personnel sub-committee, a much smaller grouping 
than the full board that the main discussions about how to deal with the crises seem to 
have taken place.  In both these cases these were safe places to raise questions about 
how things were going, that the main board was not. In the URP, the board was unsafe 
because staff were there and feeling threatened by the questions being asked. In the 
case of the LBF, the board was an unsafe place to ask questions because of the 
presence of funders, all the local great and good and other organisations in the locality 
as well as staff. There was a reputation to lose. It is also clear that the financial 
problems in both the two cases that mobilized relatively effectively were a clear 
trigger for action. 
 
Despite many efforts by successive directors, in the PMA the board was hard to 
mobilise. Efforts to engage the chair in developing strategy for example were 
frustrated by the time delays this built into the process as he was slow to respond to 
initiatives. The current CEO felt that they did not really understand the role of a board 
and were reluctant to listen to someone they saw as a bit of a youngster. There were 
clearly status issues involved in this case. 
 
The expert observed the importance of ‘the social side’ – there has to be a pay off for 
the board to take on issues like this. He felt that networking and developing good 
relationships within a context that matters to the board members was an important 
feature of effectiveness. The building of trust was important to mobilisation and there 
is something bonding about surviving adversity – ‘our parents saw the war years as 
the best years of their life’! 
 
Action 
 
Once boards decided to take control and act, time issues are to the forefront. In both 
the LBF and URP there were additional meetings of the board and of the sub-groups. 
In the latter case they were meeting every few days to touch base.  
 
At this stage of the resolution of crises in both cases the chief officer of the 
organisation lost control of events and subsequently left the organisation. Although 
both left ‘voluntarily’ in reality there was little alternative as relationships had broken 
down irretrievably. In the URP, it emerged that the CEO has been pretty much a law 
unto herself and when said to be working from home was found not to be there. The 
board’s relationship with the other development officers on the staff team started to 
deteriorate at this point too, as they felt that they were being blamed for the things that 
had gone wrong. 
 
In the LBF, relationships between the CEO and the chair started to deteriorate rapidly 
as the chair became more involved in operational issues and effectively took over the 
day to day running of the team meetings from the CEO.  This person had the time to 
get involved but it is clear from the expert’s testimony that this willingness to be fairly 
‘hands on’ in terms of involvement is not unusual at this stage of crisis management. 
 
Transition 
 
Once the initial crisis was resolved in the LBF a number of board members resigned. 
In this case they seemed to on the losing side in the arguments over whether to resolve 
the financial crisis by closing one of the organisation’s offices.  My informant in the 
URP was also considering resignation, feeling that she had done her bit for the 
organisation. The expert suggests another reason for board resignations at this point 
too – quite simply that this sort of problem-solving was not what the board member 
signed up to do. They wanted to support the mission and the unpleasantness that 
frequently surrounds these kinds of problems was not something that they wanted to 
deal with.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This evidence leads us to a number of conclusions. Firstly what is clear from these 
studies and the focus groups is the fragile nature of organisational life. Each 
organisation may be seen as a negotiated order which is easily tipped into 
disequilibrium by ‘events’. Those that seem to be particularly vulnerable are those 
that have been dominated by a strong individual for a number of years who then 
departs. This may be a founder but equally it may be a long-standing chair or chief 
officer. This departure seems to be a moment when questions may be raised that have 
not been raised before, whether because the new person needs to establish their 
credibilty or because there was greater acceptance of the activities of their 
predecessor. 
 
The events that may cause these questions to be asked can be conceived of as 
‘dangerous moments’ in the life of the organisation that have the potential to expose 
underlying weaknesses, in particular some of the process issues that we have 
identified were not addressed in the case. Dangerous moments that these cases seem 
to exemplify include: 
 
• Selecting a new chief officer or chair 
• The loss of a significant grant 
• The award of a significant grant 
• Moving from unpaid to paid workers  
• Developing management capacity as the organisation formalises 
• Exploring merger with another organisation. 
 
The focus groups and the expert also identified: 
 
• Illness of a key member of staff 
 
Such events disturb the established routines of the organisation and how the board and 
the staff respond to these may affect whether the organisation survives or not. They 
are what are known as ‘unfreezing factors’ in change management and they can have 
very positive effects but what they do is to test the strength of the fabric of the 
organisation. This is where the underlying issues come into play, as it is these often 
long-standing unresolved problems that come back to haunt the organisation.  
Common underlying problems include: 
• Failures of environmental scanning e.g. threats to what has been fairly secure 
funding base for a number of years 
• Lack of attention to process – what our expert calls ‘mission not management’ 
• Failure to develop the board 
• Unresolved arguments about strategy and values 
• Mismatched changed agendas in federal organisations that don’t take account 
of the situation at the grass roots. 
 
There seem to be a number of ‘familiar stories’ which follow common patterns. The 
executive transition one is interesting as it is one of the moments when the board is 
truly in charge of the organisation. The pattern seems to be that the board has a notion 
that the organisation needs to change and recruits a new chief executive to bring this 
about. However, the change issues are ill-thought through and as the new CEO starts 
to implement these, patterns of resistance emerge which they did not anticipate. This 
often leads them to blame the new CEO and this person is dismissed. With luck the 
next appointment process is more carefully considered and the next incumbent can 
actually bring some of the changes about. 
 
Another familiar story is about the local political context where a government agency 
needs to spend money that involves ‘the people’. They look around for a suitable 
vehicle to do this, often a small community group and give them ‘loads of money’. 
The group lacking any preparation for handling large sums of money or managing the 
staff that go with it, gets into trouble and then are either blamed for their inadequacy 
or as in our case the problems are ignored because those in a position to help feel that 
this will best serve the political interest and at times trying to show the organisation is 
succeeding (usually in the face of all the evidence to the contrary). 
 
The PMA illustrates the way in which old-established charities can lose their way. 
The British press has had several recent examples of this of which the Royal Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) is just the latest, with its very 
public blood-letting. Underpinning stories like these may be issues about high status 
boards to which people are recruited because of ‘who they are’ rather than ‘what they 
may bring’ to the organisation. Moreover such people are often less amenable to 
board development both for reasons of time pressure and because they may feel they 
already know it all. The disputes that break out into the open are usually about the 
core values of the organisation although they can manifest in ways that appear to be 
quite petty. Those that have a membership often how unresolved issues about the 
extent to which that membership is capable of controlling the operations of the 
organisation. 
 
Yet another story which can be linked to values, is the one about ‘moving on from 
charisma’ – many voluntary organisations are set up with passion by one committed 
individual but if the organisation is successful and grows then there is a need for it to 
become more formal. This process of formalisation may seem to dilute the values for 
which the organisation stands and require the founder to follow procedures and be 
accountable in ways which previously they have not had to be.  
 
Many of these situations are likely to involve power struggles between different 
factions and how boards respond to these situations can be critical to the survival of 
the organisation. Crucial in all these situations is communication between the board 
and the staff and in particular between the chair and the CEO. Breakdowns in this 
relationship are common in all of these crises. However, it can be very difficult for 
boards to react as they often feel not fully aware of the issues and there appears from 
this evidence to be reluctance to act if they do not feel committed to the organisation 
or fear that they may be wasting their time in trying to save it. This seems to have 
been the case with the SDO. The people on the board in effect lost nothing if the 
organisation disappeared. They did not have a significant enough stake in its success. 
The URP board on the other hand did. They saw that their community would lose 
control of significant assets that could be spent locally.  
 
The role of funders in creating a focus on the issues is also worthy of further 
investigation. To what extent do funders use their power to focus an organisation on 
dealing with its problems by withdrawing grant for example? All of these 
organisations appeared to have financial problems but what extent is ‘finance’ a 
metaphor that is used to focus boards on dealing with problems because of its capacity 
to threaten survival? Linked to this is the poor quality of financial information in 
many nonprofit organisations – where neither the board nor the staff may understand 
the significance of the figures presented to them.  
 
These issues all merit further exploration. All we have been able to do with this 
preliminary research is to show in even more detail the richness of the terrain and the 
issues to explore. We are hopeful that in the next year we will be able to conduct more 
detailed studies and to focus on different aspects of this 
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